Below is an e-mail that I sent to Mr. Robert Wright in response to his op-ed entitled "Who Created Major Hasan", which appears in today's New York Times:
Dear Mr. Wright,
I was the CEO of a company that specialized, inter alia, in anti-terrorist strategies. Today, I am the CEO of a boutique business advisory firm.
I read your op-ed, "Who Created Major Hasan", in today's New York Times and would like to share my thoughts.
I opposed the Iraq War. Although I questioned the existence of weapons of mass destruction, I was more concerned by the creation of imbalance between the aggressive torchbearers of Sunni (Iraq) and Shiite (Iran) Islam.
There can be no understanding of the Middle East without taking into consideration this ongoing Sunni/Shiite struggle. The latest battleground is in Yemen along the Saudi border: the armies of Saudi Arabia and Yemen are fighting Yemenite Shiites backed by Iran. Although this struggle has resulted in almost 200,000 refugees, the war itself is largely being ignored by the Western news media.
Hezbollah and Hamas, both proxies of Iran, need also be regarded from this perspective, i.e. an Iranian effort to achieve regional hegemony. Iran's war is not with Israel, although Iran benefits on the Arab street from this perception, and it is no wonder that Israel received tacit backing from both Saudi Arabia and Egypt during Operation Cast Lead and the 2006 war with Hezbollah. Note Egypt's arrest of Hezbollah operatives monitoring Suez Canal traffic several months ago.
I also oppose continued U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, because I believe it is ineffective and a waste of resources. As you observe in your op-ed, headquarters for terrorist activity can be shifted from country to country, but within limitations dictated by Sunni/Shiite enmity and shifting alliances. For example, Iran has supported the Sudanese government's war with the country's black Africans, i.e. the War in Darfur, and it is dubious whether Sudan would now be hospitable to Al Qaeda.
What does any of the above have to do with Major Hasan and the Fort Hood massacre?
If I understand your argument correctly, you are saying that the Afghanistan and Iraq wars may not have reduced the number of anti-American terrorists abroad, but have certainly inspired homegrown terrorism, which could tear the U.S. apart along religious and ethnic lines. We agree and disagree.
First, as you yourself acknowledge, your conclusions are premised upon only two incidents: 1. Hasan and the Fort Hood massacre; and 2. the murder, six months earlier, of a soldier in Little Rock. On the basis of two isolated incidents in the eight years following the September 11 attacks, I think it is a mistake to engage in far-flung extrapolation.
Rather, I think you should be asking why there have been only two such terrorist attacks. Is it possible that given the economic and educational opportunities that present themselves in the U.S., American Muslims lack motivation to engage in terrorism? Is it possible that Muslim immigrants came to the U.S. seeking economic opportunity and for the most part would do nothing that might jeopardize this freedom and potential?
In the same vein, why is terrorism rarely perpetrated by Israeli Arabs? Is it because that notwithstanding the prejudice they sometimes face in their daily lives, they also enjoy political rights and economic opportunities unavailable in the Arab world? Note that birth rates of Israeli Arabs are significantly lower than those in Arab nations. Is it possible that they have adapted to and seen advantages inherent in Western culture?
You argue that the more Americans denigrate Islam and view Muslims with suspicion, the more likely we will see "homegrown terror". I have a different perception of Americans: a people of benevolence and understanding, and although Americans might be temporarily outraged by a terrorist attack, their "homegrown tolerance" ultimately prevails and enables them to see that "one bad apple" does not spoil the barrel.
In addition, I do not view terrorism as conduct that "infects people with low resistance" per se. Rather, I view terrorism as conduct that prevails among young persons without the means to support themselves. In Gaza, Iraq and Afghanistan, thousands of young Muslim men have engaged in suicide bombings, not only because they have been saturated with anti-Western hatred, but also because their families have been promised housing and other material benefits following their "heroic" deaths.
You write: "Sept. 11, 2001, though a success for Osama bin Laden, was in the scheme of things only a small tactical triumph". There was nothing "small" about 9/11: Osama bin Laden temporarily paralyzed America's financial and transportation systems, and permanently affected the way Americans live, as anyone standing on line at a U.S. airport can attest.
All that having been said, how do we fight terror more effectively and also eliminate much of the violent imagery over the Internet, which you believe inflames Muslims and has the potential to tear the U.S. apart along religious and ethnic lines?
First, the prerequisites for terrorism must be acknowledged. Although it is easy enough for an individual would-be terrorist to purchase a rifle and open fire wherever he chooses, Al Qaeda is a sophisticated organization built upon recruitment, training, armament, logistics and funding. The September 11 attacks were not the product of an "apartment-based conspiracy".
Now suppose more effective measures are taken to curtail terrorist funding: recruitment, training, armament and logistics are all constricted and constrained. Moreover, measures taken against terrorist funding are generally non-lethal and consequently do not contribute to inflammatory imagery.
Continue the war against bid Laden? Absolutely. He should not be granted a moment's respite. However, the U.S. battle against terrorism must be grounded upon American technological strength and pinpoint strikes, which do not deprive the U.S. of its will to oppose terror and tyranny.
Yours sincerely,
Jeffrey
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You're right: recruitment, training, armament, logistics and funding had nothing to do with Fort Hood. This was the act of an individual gunman, and the question persists whether the U.S. army should have recognized the warning signs. Recognizing in advance and stopping an individual gunman - whether a jihadist, a neo-Nazi attacking a Jewish day care center in LA, or a deranged college loner with a rifle - presents different problems from those associated with organized terror.
ReplyDeleteRe Islam, there are enormous differences involving attitudes and tolerance levels, for example, among Muslims in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Kazakhstan and Israel.
In the army, there were times when my life was in the hands of Bedouin trackers, whom I trusted explicitly.